WEBVTT 00:00:00.240 --> 00:00:06.879 For centuries the mighty Rhine has been a lifeline for the people living along its 1200km 00:00:06.879 --> 00:00:10.570 length through the heart of Europe. 00:00:10.570 --> 00:00:15.759 It has also been a powerful obstacle for any army that wanted to cross it. 00:00:15.759 --> 00:00:19.970 76 years ago this would be no different. 00:00:19.970 --> 00:00:23.679 Hi, I’m Jesse Alexander, and welcome to Rhineland 45. 00:00:23.679 --> 00:00:28.930 In this documentary series we’ll take you back to the last set-piece battle on the Western 00:00:28.930 --> 00:00:30.919 Front in World War Two. 00:00:30.919 --> 00:00:34.961 And it all happened here, in the Lower Rhine region. 00:00:58.465 --> 00:01:06.770 Four years after being pushed into the sea at Dunkirk, in summer 1944 the Allies finally 00:01:06.770 --> 00:01:11.850 opened up the long-awaited Second Front with the Normandy landings. 00:01:11.850 --> 00:01:17.490 The Anglo-American armies then raced across France, though Belgium and into the Netherlands 00:01:17.490 --> 00:01:21.170 in a bid to end the war before Christmas. 00:01:21.170 --> 00:01:26.881 But their gamble to cross the Rhine in Operation Market Garden had failed, and in the winter, 00:01:26.881 --> 00:01:30.770 the Germans even launched two surprise counter offensives. 00:01:30.770 --> 00:01:35.310 Once the Wehrmacht had been stopped in the West, and with the Red Army continuing to 00:01:35.310 --> 00:01:42.810 advance into East Prussia from the East, the end of Nazi Germany was in sight. 00:01:42.810 --> 00:01:48.659 In early February 1945, Allied armies stood along Germany’s western border, ready to 00:01:48.659 --> 00:01:50.560 strike the final blow. 00:01:50.560 --> 00:01:56.439 The Americans, British, French and Canadians could turn eastwards once more, and . there 00:01:56.439 --> 00:02:03.630 was just one last natural barrier standing between them and victory – the Rhine river. 00:02:03.630 --> 00:02:06.990 For the Germans, the situation was grim. 00:02:06.990 --> 00:02:11.890 As they desperately shored up the defences west of the Rhine river and Germany’s industrial 00:02:11.890 --> 00:02:17.390 heartland in the Ruhr, they had to transfer badly needed troops to the East, where the 00:02:17.390 --> 00:02:21.170 Red Army was within striking distance of Berlin. 00:02:21.170 --> 00:02:27.324 The victories of the early war years were a distant memory now. 00:02:41.060 --> 00:02:46.190 Despite the Allied superiority in manpower and resources from Alsace in the south to 00:02:46.190 --> 00:02:52.070 the Dutch-German border in the north, defeating Germany would not be easy. 00:02:52.070 --> 00:02:57.130 The Anglo-American alliance was on the cusp of victory, but this also created tensions 00:02:57.130 --> 00:03:02.760 about where to attack, and which commander would take the lead. 00:03:02.760 --> 00:03:10.380 Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower had to juggle military priorities alongside 00:03:10.380 --> 00:03:15.280 questions of national pride, the ambitions of his top generals. 00:03:15.280 --> 00:03:20.400 The US was the senior partner in the alliance, but British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 00:03:20.400 --> 00:03:26.590 and top field commander, Field Marshal Bernhard Montgomery, still wanted to preserve an important 00:03:26.590 --> 00:03:30.630 role for Britain in the final phase of the war. 00:03:30.630 --> 00:03:35.950 Montgomery and US General Omar Bradley both argued to Eisenhower that their Army Group 00:03:35.950 --> 00:03:39.990 should lead the way into Germany. 00:03:39.990 --> 00:03:43.430 There were several possible routes of attack into Germany. 00:03:43.430 --> 00:03:48.100 The middle routes, in the Lower Rhineland between Cologne and the Dutch border, seemed 00:03:48.100 --> 00:03:53.350 the most promising to reach the flat north German plain, where the armour could make 00:03:53.350 --> 00:03:58.480 a dash for the Baltic and perhaps even Berlin. 00:03:58.480 --> 00:04:03.600 This sector of the Allied line was held by the Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group, under 00:04:03.600 --> 00:04:08.590 Montgomery, and the 9th US Army, under General Bill Simpson. 00:04:08.590 --> 00:04:16.100 Montgomery was a polarizing figure, and some US generals, were fiercely critical of him. 00:04:16.100 --> 00:04:21.180 General Bradley even said he would resign before serving under Montgomery, and one of 00:04:21.180 --> 00:04:28.900 diary entries may give a clue as to why: “We were mired in a ghastly war of attrition. 00:04:28.900 --> 00:04:34.479 Monty promptly seized on our failures to position himself for a renewed political offensive 00:04:34.479 --> 00:04:38.020 inside the high command to have his own way.” (Whitaker 12) 00:04:41.479 --> 00:04:46.310 Montgomery favored a single strike against Germany of about 40 divisions, which he wanted 00:04:46.310 --> 00:04:52.120 to lead, but Eisenhower chose a less daring compromise in January: the main effort would 00:04:52.120 --> 00:04:57.539 be in the 21st Army Group’s sector of the Rhineland, led by First Canadian Army and 00:04:57.539 --> 00:05:03.639 9th US Army - one of the few times US troops served under foreign command. 00:05:03.639 --> 00:05:09.870 The US armies to the south would still advance to the Rhine as well, but the critical supplies 00:05:09.870 --> 00:05:13.729 would go to the priority northern wing. 00:05:13.729 --> 00:05:19.539 British General Brian Horrocks was described the preparations for the corps he was commanding: 00:05:19.539 --> 00:05:25.039 “[When] this concentration was complete it would have been possible to drop even a 00:05:25.039 --> 00:05:32.009 pea into the woods around Nijmegen without hitting some part of XXX Corps.” 00:05:32.009 --> 00:05:34.219 (Zuehlke 152) 00:05:34.219 --> 00:05:39.039 From the military point of view, it made little sense to defend west of the Rhine against 00:05:39.039 --> 00:05:45.249 a superior enemy, but German commanders understood their orders were to hold out as long as possible 00:05:45.249 --> 00:05:49.769 to defend the Ruhr region, Germany’s last industrial heartland. 00:05:49.780 --> 00:05:54.780 Any movement of troops to the east bank without permission from Berlin was forbidden, 00:05:54.920 --> 00:05:59.520 and any available reserves were being sent to the Eastern Front. 00:05:59.969 --> 00:06:05.389 Adolf Hitler’s New Year message for 1945 made the strategic dilemma of the German high 00:06:05.389 --> 00:06:15.940 command abundantly clear: “My declaration of September 1, 1939 is still in place. 00:06:15.940 --> 00:06:22.910 Specifically, neither time nor force of arms can defeat the German people in this war. 00:06:22.910 --> 00:06:27.659 Above all, a November 1918 will never happen again.” (Citino 405) 00:06:33.727 --> 00:06:38.690 The Rhineland would be defended until the tide miraculously turned, or until 00:06:38.690 --> 00:06:41.820 the Wehrmacht was pushed out of it. 00:06:41.849 --> 00:06:47.210 Just days before the battle began, the German generals agreed an attack was imminent. 00:06:47.610 --> 00:06:53.819 First Parachute Army General Alfred Schlemm correctly predicted the offensive 00:06:53.819 --> 00:07:02.029 would come through the Reichswald in the direction of Wesel: “I clung to my former assumption 00:07:02.029 --> 00:07:07.879 that a thrust would come at Groesbeek-Reichs[wald]-Cleve, as such a thrust would enable [the] enemy 00:07:07.879 --> 00:07:11.920 to gain the Rhine soonest and would lead into our open flank.” 00:07:11.920 --> 00:07:15.080 (Zuehlke 169) 00:07:15.080 --> 00:07:19.200 The main Rhineland offensive would consist of two operations. 00:07:19.200 --> 00:07:24.510 First Canadian Army’s 340,000 British and Canadians would begin Operation Veritable 00:07:24.510 --> 00:07:32.390 on February 8, led by XXX Corps and supported by over 1000 guns. 00:07:32.390 --> 00:07:37.069 Their goal was to push south through the fortified German defences of the Siegfried Line, and 00:07:37.069 --> 00:07:42.459 the 13-km deep Reichswald forest, so the armoured divisions could break out over the flat farmland 00:07:42.459 --> 00:07:44.460 towards the town of Wesel. 00:07:44.460 --> 00:07:51.680 A few days later, the 300,000-strong US 9th Army would launch Operation Grenade, crossing 00:07:51.680 --> 00:07:55.949 the Roer River and moving northeast towards Wesel, to meet up with the British and Canadians 00:07:55.949 --> 00:08:01.459 . If all went according to plan, the German troops west of the Rhine would be trapped 00:08:01.459 --> 00:08:08.089 and destroyed, and the advance would be fast enough to capture a bridge at Wesel. 00:08:08.089 --> 00:08:13.760 All along the Rhine, bridges were key strategic points for both sides, and each bridge became 00:08:13.760 --> 00:08:16.959 a focal point of local operations. 00:08:16.959 --> 00:08:22.429 The men were tired from the particularly cold winter and bitter fighting since Normandy, 00:08:22.429 --> 00:08:27.640 but they were well-supplied and most were experienced and well-trained. 00:08:27.640 --> 00:08:34.660 In early 1945 the Allies had 80 divisions in Northwest Europe, two thirds of which were 00:08:34.660 --> 00:08:35.700 American. 00:08:35.700 --> 00:08:44.349 Montgomery recorded, in his particular style, his anticipation of the coming battle: “Operations 00:08:44.349 --> 00:08:48.100 Veritable and Grenade will together be a terrific party.” 00:08:48.100 --> 00:08:54.220 (Zuehlke 147) 00:08:54.220 --> 00:08:59.859 To defend the western approaches of the Reich, the German army had a less-than-ideal force. 00:08:59.859 --> 00:09:04.770 There was little in the way of reserves, since these had been expended in the failed counterattacks 00:09:04.770 --> 00:09:08.479 in the Ardennes and Alsace in January. 00:09:08.479 --> 00:09:14.530 On paper there were over 70 divisions, but these were often 50% understrength after heavy 00:09:14.530 --> 00:09:19.690 losses in the Ardennes (Zimmerman 283), and the shortage of armour was even worse. 00:09:19.690 --> 00:09:26.049 The Luftwaffe only had about 1500 aircraft available, and many of these were grounded 00:09:26.049 --> 00:09:28.080 due to fuel shortages. 00:09:28.080 --> 00:09:32.789 The First Parachute Army included several Fallschirmjäger divisions of paratroopers, 00:09:32.789 --> 00:09:38.239 though by this time in the war they were used exclusively in a ground combat role. 00:09:38.239 --> 00:09:44.870 It also had one Parachute, one Panzer Division and a Panzergrenadier Division in reserve. 00:09:44.870 --> 00:09:51.760 But there was the weak 84th Division, second rate Volksgrenadier formations, and even poorly 00:09:51.760 --> 00:09:57.669 trained and unreliable militias known as Volkssturm, consisting mostly of men over 40. 00:09:57.669 --> 00:10:03.810 There was also a critical shortage of fuel, transport, and air cover from the decimated 00:10:03.810 --> 00:10:05.849 Luftwaffe. 00:10:05.849 --> 00:10:11.070 German troops did have the advantage of some prepared defences, organized in roughly three 00:10:11.070 --> 00:10:14.780 zones in the area facing the British and Canadians. 00:10:14.780 --> 00:10:20.969 The first line ran along the edge of the Reichswald, the next was the Siegfried Line, and the third 00:10:20.969 --> 00:10:22.830 the Hochwald Layback. 00:10:22.830 --> 00:10:28.410 The Siegfried Line, called Westwall in German, ran the length of the German border. 00:10:28.410 --> 00:10:34.370 It had been started in 1939, but was left unfinished. 00:10:34.370 --> 00:10:41.270 Work restarted in 1944, and tens of thousands of forced labourers and German civilians had 00:10:41.270 --> 00:10:43.600 been pressed into service to shore it up. 00:10:43.600 --> 00:10:48.870 It consisted of minefields, trenches, gun emplacements, pillboxes, anti-tank 00:10:48.870 --> 00:10:56.140 ditches, and, in some places, the famous Dragon’s Teeth – but it was by no means complete. 00:10:56.140 --> 00:10:59.461 General Fiebig called it a “haphazard series of dugouts,” after 00:10:59.461 --> 00:11:07.600 the war (Zuehlke 165) and General Straube called it "a farce", more of an idea than a wall. (Zuehlke 169). 00:11:07.600 --> 00:11:11.350 One feature of the German defences was noted by Allied intelligence: The principle appears 00:11:11.350 --> 00:11:16.720 no longer to be that of “defensive line,” but rather that of a “defensive net.” 00:11:16.720 --> 00:11:21.590 The whole area is, in fact, being split up into a series of self-contained boxes enclosed 00:11:21.590 --> 00:11:26.609 by trenches with, in many cases, there were also anti-tank ditches or they were fronted 00:11:26.609 --> 00:11:32.169 by a river The intention of the Germans would seem to be that each box will have soldiers 00:11:32.169 --> 00:11:37.410 there committed to stay there until the end, in order to purchase time, if nothing else. 00:11:37.410 --> 00:11:38.469 (Zuehlke 166) 00:11:38.469 --> 00:11:42.260 The Germans also had the advantage of the weather and terrain. 00:11:42.260 --> 00:11:48.440 About a week before Veritable began, the weather warmed up, and the ground thawed. 00:11:48.440 --> 00:11:53.489 This turned the earth to mud, and raised the level of the numerous rivers and streams, 00:11:53.489 --> 00:11:57.730 including the Rhine – and the Germans gave Mother Nature a helping hand by breaching 00:11:57.730 --> 00:11:59.260 a few dykes as well. 00:11:59.260 --> 00:12:06.450 And the narrow corridor that was not flooded was blocked by the Reichswald, a 13km-deep 00:12:06.450 --> 00:12:07.669 forest. 00:12:07.669 --> 00:12:13.100 A First Canadian Army intelligence report saw the so-called Reichswald plug as the key 00:12:13.100 --> 00:12:19.109 to the campaign: “[The plug] closes the neck of the whole German position west of 00:12:19.109 --> 00:12:20.429 the Rhine. 00:12:20.429 --> 00:12:26.290 When it is pulled, we outflank the Maas [river] position, the West Wall, and all the lines 00:12:26.290 --> 00:12:28.859 in Holland and east of the Rhine.” 00:12:28.859 --> 00:12:34.770 (Zuehlke 160) Once out of the forest, the ground opened up into farmland normally more 00:12:34.770 --> 00:12:41.590 suitable to mobile warfare, but the soft fields would now be difficult for tanks to cross. 00:12:41.590 --> 00:12:45.970 These were the very reasons Montgomery had said months earlier that an attack should 00:12:45.970 --> 00:12:52.090 not start before March, . Given the Allied plan was to force mobile warfare on an enemy 00:12:52.090 --> 00:12:58.179 incapable of it, the attack would not be easy. 00:12:58.179 --> 00:13:03.929 In the American sector, facing the 15th Army of Army Group B, the main problem was the 00:13:03.929 --> 00:13:05.719 Roer river. 00:13:05.719 --> 00:13:11.090 Its level was controlled by two key dams to the south, which were still in German hands 00:13:11.090 --> 00:13:13.320 at the start of February. 00:13:13.320 --> 00:13:18.700 If these dams were blown, the river would become a rushing torrent, and so the 9th Army 00:13:18.700 --> 00:13:24.930 could not cross until the dams were secured by the neighbouring First US Army. 00:13:24.930 --> 00:13:30.560 Just days before Operations Veritable and Grenade were set to begin, American troops 00:13:30.560 --> 00:13:36.048 had still not taken the dams, which caused friction between US commanders. 00:13:47.150 --> 00:13:54.150 On February 8, 1945, the last set-piece battle of World War Two in the west began. 00:13:54.150 --> 00:13:58.050 Canadian General Harry Crerar’s message to the troops reminded them of the moment 00:13:58.050 --> 00:14:04.610 at hand: “The operation we are about to undertake are of the greatest possible importance. 00:14:04.610 --> 00:14:10.370 Indeed, the result of them can lead to speedy and complete Allied victory.“ 00:14:10.370 --> 00:14:16.219 (Zuehlke 187) Monty’s “party” would now begin. 00:14:16.219 --> 00:14:22.480 To get Veritable started, the Allies made use of their superior materiel and firepower. 00:14:22.480 --> 00:14:27.870 An enormous amount of supplies and ammunition were stockpiled behind the lines, including: 00:14:27.870 --> 00:14:35.690 13,000 km of communication cables, 10,000 smoke generators, and 40,000 litres of fog 00:14:35.690 --> 00:14:38.349 oil for the smokescreens. 00:14:38.349 --> 00:14:42.159 Over half a million aerial photographs were taken for planning. 00:14:42.159 --> 00:14:43.159 (Zuehlke 149). 00:14:43.159 --> 00:14:49.770 The opening salvo in Operation Veritable came from the air. 00:14:49.770 --> 00:14:56.029 2000 aircraft attacked German positions, roads, supply depots and towns in order to prevent 00:14:56.029 --> 00:14:58.873 the movement of German reserves. 00:15:14.676 --> 00:15:18.239 Christoph Bergs: During the night of the 7th to the 8th of February, the small cities of 00:15:18.239 --> 00:15:22.979 Kleve and Goch were the primary targets of Allied bombers. 00:15:22.979 --> 00:15:27.360 This is not the first time that these cities were in the bomb sights. 00:15:27.360 --> 00:15:35.380 For example, only a few months previously on the 7th October 1944, Kleve suffered a 00:15:35.380 --> 00:15:42.700 heavy bombardment as Allied Air forces tried to disrupt German reinforcements being ushered 00:15:42.700 --> 00:15:48.549 northwards towards Nijmegen after Operation Market Garden. 00:15:48.549 --> 00:15:55.810 Although the USAAF daytime raids on the 7th of February on Germany had largely been cancelled 00:15:55.810 --> 00:16:04.120 due to weather, the conditions the RAF faced at night were practically ideal for the purposes 00:16:04.120 --> 00:16:07.070 of bombing the cities of Kleve and Goch. 00:16:07.070 --> 00:16:12.021 The RAF went ahead and bombed Kleve and Goch during the night from the 7/8 February. 00:16:12.021 --> 00:16:16.120 460 bombers went for Goch, 300 for Kleve. 00:16:16.120 --> 00:16:22.419 Under the cover of darkness, the bombers came in at less than 5000ft. 00:16:22.419 --> 00:16:27.599 With good visibility that night, and with little flak and few night fighters to worry 00:16:27.599 --> 00:16:32.500 about, the attack was incredibly accurate. 00:16:32.500 --> 00:16:37.640 The attack on Goch was so devastating that it was called off after only a third of the 00:16:37.640 --> 00:16:44.330 bombers had dropped their payload, smoke made it impossible to make out the target. 00:16:44.330 --> 00:16:51.179 Kleve on the other hand, already heavily damaged in previous attacks, became even more battered 00:16:51.179 --> 00:16:53.120 than Goch. 00:16:53.120 --> 00:16:58.660 During this attack civilian casualties are hard to pinpoint, it seems that the vast majority 00:16:58.660 --> 00:17:04.880 had already fled Kleve following the previous attack in October. 00:17:04.880 --> 00:17:10.410 In fact, the October raid is usually the one remembered locally . In contrast, Goch, relatively 00:17:10.410 --> 00:17:16.750 spared so far from the toils of war, remembers the 7th of February as the day the city descended 00:17:16.750 --> 00:17:18.790 into rubble. 00:17:18.790 --> 00:17:22.959 In addition to the destruction of the cities and of course the death of civilians in both 00:17:22.959 --> 00:17:30.420 Kleve and Goch, more than a hundred slave laborers became victims, many killed for example 00:17:30.420 --> 00:17:36.140 in Kleve – unable to seek shelter in their prison cells on the Kronestrasse. 00:17:36.140 --> 00:17:42.991 They were called in previously to the city in October 1944 and were kept to build defenses 00:17:42.991 --> 00:17:45.079 knowing that the Allies would show up. 00:17:45.079 --> 00:17:51.120 They are nowadays also remembered in the local cemetery for victims of the war. 00:17:51.120 --> 00:17:55.709 The Veritable attacks was the heaviest frontline bombing since Normandy. 00:17:55.709 --> 00:18:00.900 Crerar asked XXX Corps commander General Brian Horrocks if he wanted the towns like Cleve 00:18:00.900 --> 00:18:02.809 to be ‘taken out.’ 00:18:02.809 --> 00:18:09.559 Horrocks later recalled his feelings in that moment: “No doubt, a lot of civilians, [including] 00:18:09.559 --> 00:18:12.220 women and children, were still living there. 00:18:12.220 --> 00:18:18.170 Their fate depended on how I answered Crerar’s question, and I simply hated the thought of 00:18:18.170 --> 00:18:20.579 Cleve being ‘taken out.’ 00:18:20.579 --> 00:18:25.280 All the same, if we were going to break out of the bottleneck into the German plain it 00:18:25.280 --> 00:18:30.760 was a race […]; and the German reserves would have to come through Cleve. 00:18:30.760 --> 00:18:36.120 If I could delay them by bombing it might make all the difference to the battle, and, 00:18:36.120 --> 00:18:40.699 after all, the lives of my own troops must come first. 00:18:40.699 --> 00:18:46.110 So I said ‘Yes’ – the most terrific decision I had ever had to take in my life, 00:18:46.110 --> 00:18:51.470 and I can assure you that I felt almost physically sick when, on the night before the attack, 00:18:51.470 --> 00:18:55.360 I saw bombers flying overhead on their deadly mission.” 00:18:55.360 --> 00:19:04.459 (Zuehlke 176-177) He later said he had nightmares about Cleve after witnessing the damage on 00:19:04.459 --> 00:19:08.010 the ground. 00:19:08.010 --> 00:19:13.740 Located on the eastern edge of the Reichswald, Cleve had a population of 21,000 before the 00:19:13.740 --> 00:19:19.260 war, but most had fled after the city was bombed in 1944 during Market Garden. 00:19:20.260 --> 00:19:25.910 The bombing was so intense that a British journalist riding along in a bomber compared 00:19:25.910 --> 00:19:29.330 the fires to London on it brightest day. 00:19:29.330 --> 00:19:36.720 A nurse at a hospital just outside the city recalled the harrowing night: “It was so 00:19:36.720 --> 00:19:42.780 light outside, that you could see every stone of the house opposite […] The air was a 00:19:42.780 --> 00:19:48.860 sea of fire and countless planes flew over us with their awful droning. 00:19:48.860 --> 00:19:55.730 And then the earth trembled, the bombs crashed – we all had one thought: we’re done for 00:19:55.730 --> 00:20:01.790 […] Soon the first of the wounded arrived, the ones who had been able to save themselves 00:20:01.790 --> 00:20:04.840 and then drag themselves to Bedburg. 00:20:04.840 --> 00:20:10.809 In the darkened entrance they sat or stood, filthy, bleeding and freezing. 00:20:10.809 --> 00:20:16.260 They were workers, who had been housed in the Cleve jail and had just barely been able 00:20:16.260 --> 00:20:20.290 to save themselves because the doors had been locked. 00:20:20.290 --> 00:20:24.189 […] Many of the men were only wearing a shirt, and were barefoot.” 00:20:24.189 --> 00:20:26.850 (LandkreisNrb 111) 00:20:26.850 --> 00:20:31.709 The dust had barely settled over the towns of the Lower Rhineland when Allied artillery 00:20:31.709 --> 00:20:38.679 opened up a barrage on German positions that had no equal in the West since Normandy. 00:20:38.679 --> 00:20:46.560 Starting at 5 a.m. over a thousand guns, battered the German defences for five hours. 00:20:46.560 --> 00:20:54.010 Precise, scientific calculations had gone into the fire plan – not only to destroy 00:20:54.010 --> 00:20:58.370 the defences like this bunker next to me, but also to kill or demoralize the enemy, 00:20:58.370 --> 00:21:01.620 but to do so as efficiently as possible. 00:21:01.620 --> 00:21:07.480 Smaller calibre weapons participated as well, so the larger guns could fire on targets farther 00:21:07.480 --> 00:21:08.480 away. 00:21:08.480 --> 00:21:13.199 And this mixture of guns participating in the barrage was known as a “pepper pot.” 00:21:13.199 --> 00:21:17.270 Matthew: I am joined by Vickers machine gun expert Rich Fisher. 00:21:17.270 --> 00:21:20.459 Rich, can you tell us a little bit more about what we are looking at here. 00:21:20.459 --> 00:21:24.209 Richard: So, we got the Mark I Vickers machine gun, standard British Army medium machine 00:21:24.209 --> 00:21:27.480 gun from 1912 to 1968. 00:21:27.480 --> 00:21:32.990 It's a sustained fire weapon, so it fires the standard .303 inch ammunition that you 00:21:32.990 --> 00:21:35.240 get in your Bren, your Lee Enfield rifles. 00:21:35.240 --> 00:21:39.620 It's water cooled which gives it this sustained fire. 00:21:39.620 --> 00:21:42.510 It cools the barrel much more than an air cooled weapon. 00:21:42.510 --> 00:21:47.549 It fires from 250 round ammunition belts, you keep it fed with water, you keep it fed 00:21:47.549 --> 00:21:52.439 with ammunition, it can keep going for as long as you need it to. 00:21:52.439 --> 00:21:57.750 It would be crewed by three guys plus a driver. 00:21:57.750 --> 00:22:02.480 Which means in this period of the Second World War you not having to carry these around anymore. 00:22:02.480 --> 00:22:06.040 They are being moved Universal Carries, the Bren Gun Carrier. 00:22:06.040 --> 00:22:11.050 And within that you carry enough ammunition, for it's first line ammunition. 00:22:11.050 --> 00:22:13.949 The tripod, the gun they all sort of break down. 00:22:13.949 --> 00:22:20.620 It gives it this capability to support the forward troops up to 4500 yards of fire. 00:22:20.620 --> 00:22:24.690 So absolutely immense capability for an infantry division to have. 00:22:24.690 --> 00:22:27.670 Matthew: So, how would they be aiming those guns at extreme range? 00:22:27.670 --> 00:22:30.699 Richard: You got a dial sight on this gun. 00:22:30.699 --> 00:22:35.500 The dial sight combined with special .303 ammunition, although it's the same as the 00:22:35.500 --> 00:22:39.520 Bren and the Lee Enfield, the Vickers can use the Mark 7 ammunition or the Mark 8z. 00:22:39.520 --> 00:22:44.720 The Mark 8z ammunition in technically terms is boat tailed, it means it goes further in 00:22:44.720 --> 00:22:45.990 the air. 00:22:45.990 --> 00:22:50.480 Between the dial sight and 4500 yards and that boat tailed ammunition, you are not going 00:22:50.480 --> 00:22:52.120 to see the target. 00:22:52.120 --> 00:22:56.270 You'd actually be using this sight to aim at an aiming mark, and aiming post perhaps 00:22:56.270 --> 00:22:57.810 30 yards in front. 00:22:57.810 --> 00:22:59.459 Everything else would be set up your maps. 00:22:59.459 --> 00:23:03.340 All the angles of elevation, travers, things like that. 00:23:03.340 --> 00:23:06.799 On the map, plan it out and then lay it in on the gun using the dial sight. 00:23:06.799 --> 00:23:09.360 Matthew: And who were the men actually manning these guns? 00:23:09.360 --> 00:23:12.970 Richard: In the Second World War, we have these divisional machine gun battalions. 00:23:12.970 --> 00:23:17.440 They were infantry battalions from infantry regiments, you had the Manchesters, the Cheshires, 00:23:17.440 --> 00:23:21.370 the Kensingtons, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and the Middlesex'. 00:23:21.370 --> 00:23:24.000 They all have been through the machine gun training centers. 00:23:24.000 --> 00:23:27.199 Those divisional machine gun battalions were one per infantry division. 00:23:27.199 --> 00:23:30.030 And there was a company per armoured division. 00:23:30.030 --> 00:23:35.150 And armoured division had just this brigade that needs one company for support. 00:23:35.150 --> 00:23:37.610 Those companies had 12 guns, so 3 platoons. 00:23:37.610 --> 00:23:41.380 And then the battalions, the divisional machine gun battalions had 3 companies and also a 00:23:41.380 --> 00:23:43.360 company of 4.2 inch mortars as well. 00:23:43.360 --> 00:23:47.260 So it was really the heavy small arms that were able to the infantry divisions. 00:23:47.260 --> 00:23:52.569 Matthew: How did the Vickers fit into the "pepper pop" fire plans that we had during 00:23:52.569 --> 00:23:53.569 Veritable? 00:23:53.569 --> 00:23:58.410 Richard: The Vickers with the .303 ammunition, is really the smallest grain of the pepper 00:23:58.410 --> 00:23:59.610 in that "pot". 00:23:59.610 --> 00:24:04.670 When you combine it with an explosive shells of the 25 pounder, the larger scale artillery, 00:24:04.670 --> 00:24:07.441 the small, the medium, all of that stuff. 00:24:07.441 --> 00:24:09.970 The .303 ammunition in that bore isn't explosive. 00:24:09.970 --> 00:24:12.169 But it fills in all of those gaps. 00:24:12.169 --> 00:24:18.459 The beaten zones that it creates at the distances it's working at, mean you can saturate an 00:24:18.459 --> 00:24:25.760 area with the high explosives and then switch to .303 bore back to high explosives, whatever. 00:24:25.760 --> 00:24:30.439 It gives you some real flexibility and some real capability to the infantry division to 00:24:30.439 --> 00:24:35.601 provide that true saturation in the pot. 00:24:35.601 --> 00:24:41.790 The bombardment hit the soldiers of the German 84th Division particularly hard. 00:24:41.790 --> 00:24:48.170 They were manning the first line of defence inside the Reichswald in the trenches where 00:24:48.170 --> 00:24:50.329 I am walking right now. 00:24:50.329 --> 00:24:55.350 After the battle, Calgary Highlanders found a letter one German soldier had scribbled 00:24:55.350 --> 00:25:01.470 during the action: “When Tommy began his attack he started such a terrific artillery 00:25:01.470 --> 00:25:04.699 barrage that we took leave of our senses. 00:25:04.699 --> 00:25:09.220 I shall not forget my experience in the Reichswald for a long time.” 00:25:09.220 --> 00:25:12.260 (Zuehlke 198) 00:25:12.260 --> 00:25:17.930 Once the barrage had done its work, the ground assault plunged into the forest. 00:25:17.930 --> 00:25:25.720 50,000 troops, 500 tanks and 500 special tracked vehicles surged ahead into the forest, where 00:25:25.720 --> 00:25:33.590 11,000 Germans, 136 guns, and a few dozen tanks awaited them (Colvin 46). 00:25:33.590 --> 00:25:38.660 On the northern flank, the two Canadian divisions had the job of securing the flooded villages 00:25:38.660 --> 00:25:44.140 next to the Rhine, and opening up the road to Cleve so that the British units could continue 00:25:44.140 --> 00:25:45.850 the advance. 00:25:45.850 --> 00:25:51.270 The river had risen so quickly after the Germans breached the dykes, that the only way to advance 00:25:51.270 --> 00:25:57.260 was in special-purpose amphibious Buffalo vehicles, hopping from village to village, 00:25:57.260 --> 00:26:00.500 which were now islands in a shallow lake. 00:26:00.500 --> 00:26:05.920 The 3rd had earned itself the nickname the “Water Rats” because of its experience 00:26:05.920 --> 00:26:10.390 in waterlogged Holland, and this would be their wettest job yet. 00:26:10.390 --> 00:26:15.319 This was my grandfather’s division, but Private James Chabot was still recovering 00:26:15.319 --> 00:26:18.940 from wounds in hospital for the time being. 00:26:18.940 --> 00:26:26.470 The Canadian Scottish summed up the scene facing the Canadians: “As far as we could 00:26:26.470 --> 00:26:32.840 see, what had yesterday been dry land was now fit only for the traffic of the Royal 00:26:32.840 --> 00:26:33.840 Navy.” 00:26:33.840 --> 00:26:39.560 (Zuehlke 174) 00:26:39.560 --> 00:26:44.120 Despite the challenges, the flooded villages were taken and the road opened, which would 00:26:44.120 --> 00:26:47.189 allow the British divisions to lead the way. 00:26:47.189 --> 00:26:51.500 The thinly-held German lines in the western sector of the forest and along the Dutch border 00:26:51.500 --> 00:26:57.090 were soon taken, though to the men on the ground the going was tough. 00:26:57.090 --> 00:27:02.790 The wet weather turned the few tracks in the forest to streams of mud, which were targeted 00:27:02.790 --> 00:27:05.760 by well-placed German machine guns. 00:27:05.760 --> 00:27:11.319 In addition, there were numerous minefields that slowed the advance, since it was particularly 00:27:11.319 --> 00:27:16.180 difficult to clear them when the flail tanks got stuck in the mud. 00:27:16.180 --> 00:27:22.240 Exploding shells also sent wood splinters flying through the air, adding another hazard. 00:27:22.240 --> 00:27:27.600 In the 53rd Welsh Division sector, there was only one track for vehicles to advance into 00:27:27.600 --> 00:27:34.150 the darkness of the wood, so the infantry often had to go in without tanks. 00:27:34.150 --> 00:27:40.270 Stretcher bearer Peter Victory Huntley recalled the pressure of treating wounded men: “You 00:27:40.270 --> 00:27:45.120 could hear this cry going up, all along the front, a cry for help. 00:27:45.120 --> 00:27:48.069 You didn’t know where to go first. 00:27:48.069 --> 00:27:54.140 You had to feel in the dark where his wound was and put on a shell dressing or tourniquet. 00:27:54.140 --> 00:28:00.130 There was no chance to do anything more, not even to administer a shot of morphine. 00:28:00.130 --> 00:28:06.180 We just had to get him out fast and get back to the next one, lying there waiting his turn.” 00:28:06.180 --> 00:28:10.150 (Whitaker 89). 00:28:10.150 --> 00:28:14.630 Some of the stiffest resistance was being put up by several battalions of paratroopers 00:28:14.630 --> 00:28:20.740 who had been sent into the woods to shore up the defences before the attack began. 00:28:20.740 --> 00:28:26.949 One of them, locally-born Leutnant Hans Hüneborn, was sent into the forest on a patrol and ended 00:28:26.949 --> 00:28:34.410 up there for three days: “My commander, a major, said I was to report to him in a 00:28:34.410 --> 00:28:37.069 cellar where he had his headquarters. 00:28:37.069 --> 00:28:42.819 I was just 50 metres from the house when I saw the British soldiers – there were many 00:28:42.819 --> 00:28:43.819 tanks. 00:28:43.819 --> 00:28:46.530 I shot three tanks with my panzerfaust. 00:28:46.530 --> 00:28:49.289 I believe they were damaged. 00:28:49.289 --> 00:28:53.450 Then a grenade hit the trench where we were and I was wounded. 00:28:53.450 --> 00:28:59.540 […] That night, I walked out of the forest and went to my parents’ house.” 00:28:59.540 --> 00:29:02.309 (Whitaker 104) 00:29:02.309 --> 00:29:07.860 On February 9th, XXX Corps continued to make progress in spite of the conditions, and took 00:29:07.860 --> 00:29:12.569 the high ground near Cleve known as the Materborn feature. 00:29:12.569 --> 00:29:17.620 This position had been heavily fortified with concrete emplacements and was expected to 00:29:17.620 --> 00:29:20.090 offer serious resistance. 00:29:20.090 --> 00:29:24.780 But the German reinforcements sent in to hold it but arrived too late. 00:29:24.780 --> 00:29:29.189 When Horrocks received word that the Materborn had been taken, he thought the breakthrough 00:29:29.189 --> 00:29:35.110 had been achieved, and it was time to send the 43rd Wessex Division through to rush towards 00:29:35.110 --> 00:29:36.230 Cleve. 00:29:36.230 --> 00:29:41.990 In reality, the 15th Scottish was in the process of being stopped outside Cleve by the newly 00:29:41.990 --> 00:29:44.850 arrived German paratroopers. 00:29:44.850 --> 00:29:50.030 When the Wessexmen tried to move forward along the one available road, a massive traffic 00:29:50.030 --> 00:29:55.449 jam was created in the mud, making movement nearly impossible. 00:29:55.449 --> 00:30:02.049 Horrocks later regretted sending the 43rd in too soon: “One of the worst mistakes 00:30:02.049 --> 00:30:08.020 I made in the war…My only excuse is that all too often during the war I had witnessed 00:30:08.020 --> 00:30:13.670 a pause in the battle when one division was ordered to pass through another, which allowed 00:30:13.670 --> 00:30:15.740 the enemy time to recover.” 00:30:15.740 --> 00:30:21.630 (Zuehlke 230) 00:30:21.630 --> 00:30:28.130 In spite of the weather and logistical problems, XXX Corps moved slowly but steadily ahead. 00:30:28.130 --> 00:30:33.209 The ruins of Cleve were taken on February 10, a day ahead of schedule. 00:30:33.209 --> 00:30:42.000 A British officer recalled the absolute destruction of Cleve: “Bomb craters and fallen trees 00:30:42.000 --> 00:30:44.090 were everywhere. 00:30:44.090 --> 00:30:49.780 Bomb craters packed so tightly together that the debris from one was piled against the 00:30:49.780 --> 00:30:56.039 rim of the next in a pathetic heap of rubble, roofs and radiators. 00:30:56.039 --> 00:31:02.650 There was not an undamaged house anywhere, piles of smashed furniture, clothing, children’s 00:31:02.650 --> 00:31:09.959 books and toys, old photographs and bottled fruit were spilled in hopeless confusion into 00:31:09.959 --> 00:31:15.540 gardens from sagging, crazy skeletons of homes.” 00:31:15.540 --> 00:31:18.100 (Hastings 404) 00:31:18.100 --> 00:31:23.150 The northern sector of the Siegfried Line had fallen, but the Germans were not beaten 00:31:23.150 --> 00:31:24.570 yet. 00:31:24.570 --> 00:31:29.860 Already on the evening of February 8, reserves began to be fed into the battle. 00:31:29.860 --> 00:31:35.059 Now that Army Group H commander General Johannes Blaskowitz had accepted the main attack was 00:31:35.059 --> 00:31:40.809 underway, a parachute division was shifted away from the American sector and into the 00:31:40.809 --> 00:31:43.809 line against First Canadian Army. 00:31:43.809 --> 00:31:50.069 47th Panzer Corps was also sent into the line and ,along with emergency units scraped together 00:31:50.069 --> 00:31:57.073 from stragglers, it launched desperate counterattacks to stop the British advance and retake Cleve. 00:32:00.340 --> 00:32:04.750 None of the German commanders expected to hold the first line of defence, but at least 00:32:04.750 --> 00:32:07.370 now Allied intentions were clear. 00:32:07.370 --> 00:32:19.250 Blaskowitz asked to carry out a strategic retreat, but received this 00:32:19.250 --> 00:32:26.590 reply from Berlin: “The enemy might be able to storm the ruins of a bunker or a town, 00:32:26.590 --> 00:32:31.470 but these will not be evacuated unless it is on the orders of the Fuehrer.” 00:32:31.470 --> 00:32:33.270 LankreisNrb 119 00:32:33.270 --> 00:32:38.600 By February 13, the Germans and the conditions on the ground had slowed the Allied advance 00:32:38.600 --> 00:32:42.890 to a virtual standstill just outside of Cleve, but the situation was tense. 00:32:42.890 --> 00:32:52.659 Von Rundstedt reported on the 12th that Army Group B, whose 15th Army would defend against 00:32:52.659 --> 00:32:58.199 the coming American Operation Grenade, was down to just 300 tanks. 00:32:58.199 --> 00:33:02.929 Further south, the second arm of the offensive to clear the German army west of the Rhine 00:33:02.929 --> 00:33:05.789 was set to launch soon after Veritable. 00:33:05.789 --> 00:33:12.090 But here again, Mother Nature held all the cards, since the critical Roer river dams 00:33:12.090 --> 00:33:19.650 had to be secured before the 9th could cross to prevent the Germans from flooding the river. 00:33:19.650 --> 00:33:24.890 The dams were in US 1st Army’s area under General Bradley, and although there were plans 00:33:24.890 --> 00:33:28.429 to take them in December, the advance stalled. 00:33:28.429 --> 00:33:33.221 The delay was partly due to the bloody and drawn-out fighting in the Hürtgenwald, but 00:33:33.221 --> 00:33:38.970 it has also been suggested that Bradley was in no hurry to set the stage for his rival 00:33:38.970 --> 00:33:41.209 Montgomery’s operation. 00:33:41.209 --> 00:33:46.110 Finally, the two most important dams were taken by February 9. 00:33:46.110 --> 00:33:50.860 but the Germans had opened the floodgates of the massive Schwammenauel Dam and wrecked 00:33:50.860 --> 00:33:53.160 the mechanism to close them. 00:33:53.160 --> 00:34:00.259 100 million tons of water were flowing inexorably into the Roer, and its rising waters would 00:34:00.259 --> 00:34:04.460 be impassable for an unknown period of time. 00:34:04.460 --> 00:34:09.670 Montgomery visited the area on February 12 and had no choice but to delay the start of 00:34:09.670 --> 00:34:17.499 Grenade until the waters calmed: “The conditions in the river valley are appalling and Grenade 00:34:17.499 --> 00:34:20.000 is impossible at present. 00:34:20.000 --> 00:34:24.249 It may well be one week or more before we can launch it. 00:34:24.249 --> 00:34:30.799 Meanwhile Veritable must carry on alone and it is therefore bound to go slowly unless 00:34:30.799 --> 00:34:34.450 it can be strengthened, and this I intend to do.” 00:34:34.450 --> 00:34:37.380 (Zuehlke). 00:34:37.380 --> 00:34:42.329 The British and Canadians would have to fight on for a little longer before help arrived. 00:34:42.329 --> 00:34:47.420 And until the Americans could join the fray, First Canadian Army would be alone in facing 00:34:47.420 --> 00:34:49.479 everything the Germans had left to offer.